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The French President Nicolas Sarkozy wants to protect companies in the 
EU from the fallout of the financial crisis with the help of European sover-
eign wealth funds. He claims that he is not trying to subsidize businesses, 
and simply wishes to stabilize the situation in the midst of the turmoil. In 
other words, Sarkozy is asking for solidarity in order to protect the Euro-
pean economic and social model. What are the challenges with which this 
model will be confronted in the future? 
I 
Everybody’s talking about 
“social Europe” 
Solidarity did not suddenly become a key-
word in European politics at the outbreak 
of the financial and banking crisis. If you 
type the term “social Europe” into a search 
engine on your computer, you will be re-
warded with 245,000 hits - an accumula-
tion of texts which could easily fill whole 
libraries. The keyword “European social 
model” leads us to similar magnitudes, for 
here we are faced with 93,000 responses 
that are all there and waiting to be ex-
plored. 
 
There can be no doubt about the fact that 
anything which is social is riding high in 
Europe. All this despite the fact that the 
European Union, seen from the vantage 
point of its architecture, is first of all an 
internal market and a legal community in 
which quite a lot of agricultural policy-
making is going on, but where something 
such as social policy was never actually 
part of the plan. In the EU financial 
framework for the period between 2007 to 
2013 there are six headings ranging from 
growth and employment to the EU as 
global player. One searches in vain for the 
keyword “social.”  The annual budget for 
2007 at least contains the heading “Em-
ployment and Social Affairs,” for which 
€11 billion have been earmarked. The EU 
spends five times as much on agriculture. 
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This is another reason why the rejection of 
Sarkozy’s proposals can hardly come as a 
surprise. Within the EU integrated eco-
nomic and social policies exist only in a 
very rudimentary form. 
 
The amount of money being spent and the 
modish use of certain terms are thus in 
stark contrast to one another. Neverthe-
less, the talk about a social Europe or the 
European social model is becoming in-
creasingly popular. Primarily, of course, 
among moderate left-wingers. Socialists 
and Social Democrats in the European Par-
liament want to use the subject next year 
in order to win the European elections. 
Thus the title of their recently issued 
pamphlet is “Inclusive Europe, Europe for 
all.” 
 
The Commission is also sympathetic to the 
term. The team around José Manuel Bar-
roso was initially considered to be liberal. 
Indeed, it was reviled as being “neo-
liberal,” especially in France. In July 2008 
the Commission launched its “renewed so-
cial agenda,” which is “designed to ensure 
that European Union policies respond ef-
fectively to today’s economic and social 
challenges,” as the press release on the 
subject put it. The subtitle stated that this 
social agenda was about “opportunities, 
access and solidarity in 21st century 
Europe.”  These passages read like a pref-
ace to Sarkozy’s call for more protection 
for Europe’s companies and jobs. 
 
But let us forget Sarkozy for a moment. 
These “economic and social challenges” 
refer on the one hand to the changes 
brought about by globalization, and on the 
other to demographic change. “Globaliza-
tion is generally considered to be an ex-
ternal phenomenon, and all too infre-
quently as a development on which poli-
cymakers can exert some influence,” we 
are told in a position paper issued by the 
German government in July 2006. “As a 
result European attempts to shape global-
ization in terms of an improvement of our 
external competitiveness lack coherence.” 
 
Here the German government under An-
gela Merkel brackets together competi-
tiveness and maintaining the level of em-
ployment. The EU institutions in Brussels 
do exactly the same. The disagreements 
between Paris and Berlin with regard to 
the European sovereign wealth funds are 
about methodology, not principles. Seen in 
this way, social policy and internal market 
policy are twins, as it were. If one 
strengthens the internal market, one is 
protecting jobs and thus acquiring room 
for manoeuvre with regard to social pro-
tection and social policy. 
 
This is where the phenomenal success of 
the catchphrase “European social model” 
has its origins. And this model, one is told 
just about everywhere, needs to be mod-
ernized so that it can be defended in the 
years to come. This can mean one of two 
things (or both). On the one hand the wel-
fare states within the European Union 
need to be modernized, no matter, to use 
the typology introduced by Esping-
Andersen, whether we are talking about 
the Scandinavian, British, Continental or 
south European varieties. 
 
On the other hand it can refer to the mod-
ernization of the very notion of the “Euro-
pean welfare state,” which needs to dem-
onstrate and assert its legitimacy both in 
the EU member states and in the EU taken 
as a whole. In the following this spotlight 
concentrates on the second topic. 
 
II 
Economic existence and 
European consciousness 
“Where one is dealing with constraints to 
which the welfare state is subject, it would 
be a mistake to concentrate solely on 
globalization,” Anthony Giddens warned in 
2007 in his book “Europe in the Global 
Age.”  Some of the core problems, Giddens 
believes, derive from “endogenous struc-
tural change.” In addition to demographics 
he points to deindustrialization and cer- 
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tain patterns of poverty and social exclu-
sion. The transformation of attitudes to 
families and women would have to be in-
cluded among the inner factors of change, 
indeed, even migration became an issue 
within Europe before anyone began to talk 
about globalization. 
 
Yet no matter how endogenous or exoge-
nous factors actually relate to one another, 
Giddens also believes that the opportuni-
ties for growth and the development of the 
labour market are closely linked. There is 
nowadays no vision of the future of the 
European welfare state which manages to 
get by without “jobs and growth.” 
 
The word “social” did not first become 
popular in the EU in the days of suppos-
edly neo-liberal capitalism and a deregu-
lated financial and banking sector. In the 
late 1980s the then President of the Com-
mission, Jacques Delors, saw to it that the 
Community would devote its energies to 
more than only the internal market. His 
opponent in those days was Margaret 
Thatcher. At home and in Brussels the 
British Prime Minister pursued an unpar-
alleled policy of deregulation. Yet the very 
fact that she was so interested in promot-
ing the internal market meant that she had 
to make concessions to her partners else-
where – and Delors jumped at the chance. 
 
Delors’ first show-piece, the Single Euro-
pean Act of 1986, which was also the first 
amendment of the EEC Treaty for thirty 
years, defined and stipulated the task of 
promoting “economic and social cohesion.” 
On the other hand, it contained no more 
than two specific social policy provisions – 
on safety at the workplace and on social 
dialogue. This was not enough for the 
Frenchman, who came from a Christian 
social background. 
 
By the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993 Jacques Delors had managed to set 
in motion an increasingly broad debate 
about the “social plinth” and about guar-
anteeing basic social rights in the Com-
munity of Twelve. And even if the results 
were less than he had hoped for, the Maas-
tricht Treaty contained a protocol which 
allowed eleven of its twelve members – 
the United Kingdom, as was to be ex-
pected, stood aloof under Thatcher’s suc-
cessor John Major, something which was 
only straightened out in the Treaty of Am-
sterdam – to take action on the basis of 
unanimity in the vast majority of areas re-
lating to labour laws and social legislation. 
Delors always considered this basic text to 
be a personal success. 
“Barroso decides to hoist 
the social policy flag” 
The Commission under Barroso with its 
different political affiliations has once 
again decided to hoist the social policy 
flag, though this has something to do with 
the circumstances and the markets. Those 
who shoulder responsibilities in the Euro-
pean Union have been under pressure, at 
the latest since the French No vote on the 
Constitutional Treaty. Thus increasingly 
vociferous critics maintain that the Euro-
pean Union is not a protective shield, but 
the vanguard of the proponents of global-
ization and deregulation. This is the rea-
son why Barroso came out with a “re-
newed social agenda” in July 2008. 
 
B a c k  i n  t h e  d a y s  o f  D e l o r s  t h e  d e v e l o p -
ment of the internal market led to the in-
ception of a small strand in European so-
cial policy which was destined to have im-
portant consequences. Today it is the rapid 
and often terrifying pace of the globalized 
markets which sustains the debate within 
the EU. In both cases social policy became 
the subject of power struggles. On both 
occasions there was an expansion of exist-
ing markets and the creation of new ones, 
and on both occasions there were vocifer-
ous calls to limit their scope. “We must de-
fine more clearly at European level both 
the role of the market and the limits (!) to 
the market,” we are told in the pamphlet 
issued by the European Social Democrats. 
 
If one says “market,” one also has to say 
“social.” That is not only what Social De- 
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mocrats believe. The Treaty of Lisbon 
states (for the first time) that the social 
market economy is the model to which we 
should all aspire. And thus bringing it 
about with the help of justice and competi-
tion has been declared to be the future 
task of this Union. 
 
 
III 
Has the EU not been social 
all along? 
What was being touted in Delors’ day and 
age and more particularly during Barroso’s 
term of office as new and innovative was 
of course in essence as old as the hills. 
This proposition may sound surprising, 
but the EEC and the EU were designed to 
be “social” from the very beginning and as 
part of their innermost being at that. 
 
Even in the days when the political or-
ganization of Europe was still called the 
“European Economic Community,” and es-
pecially when it was enlarged and trans-
formed itself into the European Commu-
nity and the European Union, it had al-
ready been pursuing social policies for a 
long time and on a very large scale at that. 
The only thing was that no one was al-
lowed to say so in public. Europe’s heads 
of state and government from the time of 
Adenauer to the days of Merkel were not 
keen to spell out what was really happen-
ing because they were afraid of the voters. 
As the years went by this made many 
things more complicated than would in 
fact have been necessary.  
 
For example, from the time of its inception 
in the EEC Treaty of 1957 the Common 
Agricultural Policy was in effect social pol-
icy. Thus the CAP was supposed to raise 
the level of agricultural productivity, to 
supply consumers with sufficient food-
stuffs at reasonable prices – and to ensure 
appropriate incomes in the agricultural 
sector. For a certain segment of the econ-
omy the EEC made a point of deliberately 
pursuing social policies – and the EU con-
tinues to adhere to this tradition in an age 
in which it makes direct payments to 
farmers. 
 
The current EU Structural and Cohesion 
Policy also amounts to social policy inas-
much as we are dealing with a classical 
policy of redistribution. The regions have 
been anthropomorphized as it were, and 
are treated as if they were rich or poor. 
 
If one takes the two areas of agricultural 
and regional policy together, then the EU 
spends far more than half of its budget on 
“social policies.” But no one calls it that. 
Seen from this angle, “social Europe” has 
existed not only since Delors and the work 
on the Treaty of Maastricht. As early as 
1957, incidentally, the (modestly financed) 
European Social Fund was set up by the 
founding members of the EEC and en-
shrined in the Treaties of Rome. 
 
Thus the old EEC was already unwilling to 
accept the difference in prosperity   
between its member states and tried to do 
something about it. Although this may not 
have been a great success, its critics then 
and now easily forget this ethical political 
position. Self-imposed solidarity followed 
growing integration and numerous bouts 
of enlargement (these, incidentally, also 
amounted to a social measure, for they 
were supposed to secure and expand the 
zone of prosperity) like a ghostly double. 
 
IV 
New social policy  
approaches 
Yet what do the resources and instruments 
for this look like, and, above all, what will 
they have to look like in the future? The 
specialist literature on the subject makes a 
distinction between regulatory policy of 
the kind contained in the Treaties of Rome 
and its successors right up to the Treaty of 
Lisbon, redistributional policy (agricul-
tural and structural policy are two exam-
ples mentioned above) and collective ac- 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
o
l
i
d
a
r
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
5
 
#
 
2
0
0
8
/
1
1
 
cords and agreements concluded in the 
context of the social dialogue between the 
social partners. Apart from this one would 
have to analyze the rulings of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in order to ascertain 
their social consequences. 
 
Of course it would be an error to suppose 
that this useful categorization was based 
on logical planning by policymakers. The 
European Union has never promulgated 
social policy in one fell swoop. “The ques-
tion of ‘the right’ European social dimen-
sion is completely unresolved and the sub-
ject of political power struggles,” Andrej 
Stuchlík and Christian Kellermann stated 
in a study for the SPD-affiliated Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation in September 2008. 
“What is especially difficult about the for-
mulation of social policy proposals for all 
those involved is above all the high degree 
of complexity which has come about as a 
result of the interdependencies of the pol-
icy areas and the responsibilities of the 
various levels.”  Europe’s path to a social 
union can only be forged by an “intelligent 
mix of national and European compe-
tences.” However, “Europe is still a long 
way away from that.” 
 
Method(s) and goal have not been properly 
matched, and all too often things happen 
by chance. This is the most noticeable 
weakness of European social policy, and it 
will impede its future development. And if 
one looks 
closely at what 
is going on, it 
would be 
wrong to re-
strict one’s 
findings to so-
cial policy. 
They would 
have to be ap-
plied to “gov-
ernance,” the 
practical ac-
tivities and ac-
tions of the Un-
ion taken as a 
whole. The 
best example 
of such find-
ings is what is 
currently 
probably the 
most ambitious 
EU social pro-
gramme. Eight 
years ago the 
then 15 mem-
bers of the Un-
ion set themselves the goal of turning 
Europe into the most competitive and dy-
namic knowledge-based economy in the 
world by the year 2010. By this date the 
Union, according to the so-called Lisbon 
strategy, was to have “become a model of 
economic, social and ecological progress in 
the world within the framework of the 
global goal of sustainable development.”   
 
These self-appointed goals will of course 
not have been attained by 2010, and for 
this reason the EU Commission and the  
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European Council have revised them sev-
eral times in recent years. 
 
Fundamentally, of course, the EU is stick-
ing to its goals. The employment quota is 
supposed to reach 70 per cent (hitherto it 
has been 66 per cent). One in two workers 
over the age of 50 is to have a job – most 
of the 27 member states are a long way 
away from this. An employment quota of 
60 per cent for women is a declared goal – 
today the figure that has been reached is 
57 per cent. Reforms of the labour markets 
and the social security systems on the 
lines of the (Danish) flexicurity model are 
part of the plan, the only problem being 
that in many places progress on this point 
has been very slow. Lifelong learning is a 
core topic of the Lisbon strategy, but with 
the exception of the Scandinavian coun-
tries there is still a long way to go. Each 
EU member state is supposed to be spend-
ing three per cent of GDP on research and 
development. Currently the average being 
reported is no more than two per cent.  
 
Furthermore, the Commission complained 
at the end of 2007 about shortcomings in 
the area of education. “Europe has not 
made any substantial progress in meeting 
its targets in this area. A determined effort 
must be made to raise the basic skills of 
young people and to drastically reduce 
early school leaving.”  
 
Each one of these goals presupposes social 
changes – and thus political design, or so-
cial policy, and no longer only on the level 
of the member states. 
 
If one wishes to increase the proportion of 
working women, one will, for example, 
have to provide better child care. Lifelong 
learning and the reduction in the number 
of people who do not complete their 
schooling requires educational and social 
policy flanking measures. Thus whoever 
wants a competitive knowledge society 
cannot dodge the issue of a social Europe. 
All the members of the EU have recog-
nized that this is the case – even if what 
they have done within the framework of 
the Lisbon strategy is in many respects a 
disappointment. 
 
Social Europe is thus a requisite, com-
mended and concomitant feature of an in-
ternal market which wants to be on a par 
with the best in the world, above all with 
the United States and Japan. However, the 
EU does not cut a good figure when such 
comparisons are made, and the financial  
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market crisis, which is weakening every-
one in the world, should not make one for-
get Europe’s lacklustre performance. 
 
There is on the one hand, as we have seen, 
the unfavourable age structure – every 
fifth European is already older than sixty. 
On top of this, low birth rate will lead to a 
rapid decline in the working population in 
Europe. The United States, on the other 
hand, is managing to keep its population 
at the same level. In the year 2000 17 per 
cent fewer young men and 21 per cent 
fewer young women were working in the 
EU than in the U.S. In the case of older 
employees the gap was just about the 
same. The Commission assumes in its “so-
cial agenda” that by 2050, as a result of 
the ageing process, expenditure on pen-
sions and health care will have risen to 4 
to 8 per cent of GDP. 
“Social Europe is necessary 
to get a competitive 
knowledge society” 
From the 1980s onwards growth in the EU 
with 15 members declined uninterrupt-
edly, and now the gross domestic product 
is only 70 per cent of the U.S. level. The 
Belgian economist André Sapir, in a report 
for the EU Commission in July 2003, ex-
plained the gap between the U.S. and the 
EU thus: a third of the GDP was due to 
lower productivity, a third was due to 
shorter working hours, and a third to a 
lower employment rate. 
 
Sapir’s hotly debated report appeared a 
year before the enlargement of the EU by 
ten and eventually 12 new members. The 
EU model of governance, conceived for a 
small community, was becoming increas-
ingly complex and had to cope with the 
vagaries of market integration as well as 
with a continually growing number of pol-
icy areas. Social policy is without doubt 
one of the most important areas. Its task is 
to secure the cohesion of an increasingly 
unequal Union. Apart from being the “an-
swer to globalization,” this is the second 
mammoth challenge facing the European 
social state. 
 
In 2007 the EU Commission came to the 
following conclusions: “Enlargement has 
made inequality and the problems of EU 
cohesion more pronounced. The EU popu-
lation has increased by 20 per cent while 
the addition to European GDP is only 5 per 
cent, resulting in a drop of output per 
head of 12.5 per cent in the EU-25. More-
over, the new Member States are charac-
terised by strong regional disparities with 
wealth concentrated in a small number of 
regions. The population living in regions 
with output per head of less than 75 per 
cent of the EU has increased from 73 mil-
lion to 123 million.” The ageing of the 
population will mean that by 2040 poten-
tial growth in the EU will sink from what 
is now 2 to 2.25 per cent to about 1.25 per 
cent. The cumulative effect of such a de-
cline means that per capita GDP will be 
about 20 per cent lower than might nor-
mally have been expected. 
 
V 
European “team spirit” 
Demographics, age structure, the devel-
opment of the family and the conse-
quences of enlargement prove that it 
would be a dangerous error of judgement 
to design a future social policy for Europe 
as an “answer” to globalization and noth-
ing else. Europe must come to terms with 
itself just as much as it must come to 
terms with globalization. And in doing so 
it should not make the mistake of thinking 
that “globalization” is taking place some-
where else far away, but not here. 
 
This view has now become generally ac-
cepted among influential people in Brus-
sels, although it does not mean that the 
message has got through to a lot of EU 
citizens. In this autumn, the financial and 
banking crisis seems merely to have rein-
forced their defence reflexes. “The finan-
cial crisis has not only nourished scepti-
cism about economic freedoms, but also  
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nurtured the widespread conviction that 
social justice and equality are not in very 
good shape.” That is how Renate Köcher 
described for example the mood of Ger-
m a n s  i n  O c t o b e r .  I t  i s  h i g h l y  i r o n i c  t h a t  
precisely at this juncture a Frenchman has 
given them an answer in the shape of in-
terventionist policies.  
 
In the poll the call for the interventionist 
state goes hand in hand with a widespread 
mistrust of private and family property. 
Many citizens are not interested in com-
petitiveness; they are merely concerned 
about the security of their workplace and 
of their savings. 
 
And this leads us to the crux of the matter, 
even though it is something that is virtu-
ally impossible to measure, and very diffi-
cult to explain with the help of economic 
or sociological models. The fact is that 
solidarity in a welfare state presupposes a 
minimum “team spirit,” or of co-
responsibility. However, what is the state 
of the Europeans’ “team spirit” today, and 
how will it develop in the shadow of 
keener international, sub-national and 
European competition? What kind of gov-
ernance is this solidarity supposed to en-
courage? And what actually is the place of 
the European, of the ordinary citizen in 
this European Union? 
 
Why do “we” half a billion people in the 
EU actually live and work together? This 
question is just as important for our future 
as the question of defining the right kind 
of economic and social governance for 
Europe. 
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